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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Robroy Wall, Jr., appeals, pro se, from the district court’s order denying his
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a November 4, 2011 order dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the relevant factual and procedural background of this
case, as follows:
Petitioner Robroy Wall, Jr. was found guilty by jury verdict of
first-degree murder with [a] sentence enhancement for use of a firearm.
The Court sentenced Wall to twenty-five years fixed followed by an
indeterminate period of life. Following sentencing, Petitioner filed a Rule
35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the Court denied on September
13, 2005. Petitioner then filed a direct appeal of the sentence, and his
sentence was affirmed in State v. Wall, Jr., 149 Idaho 548, 237 P.3d 17
([Ct. App.] 2010).
On April 8, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post
Conviction Relief stating five grounds upon which he based his petition.
On the same day, the Petitioner filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for
Appointment of Counsel. In response, the Court issued an Order Granting
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. On May 5, 2011, the State filed an
Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
On May 16, 2011, the Court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss
Post Conviction Relief Petition finding, based on the filed Petition for Post
Conviction Relief filed April 8, 2011, “the Court is satisfied that the
petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings.” The Notice of Intent to
Dismiss was served on Petitioner’s counsel, Respondent’s counsel, and a
copy was mailed to the Petitioner on May 17, 2011 according to the
Certificate of Service. Petitioner’s counsel then filed a Motion for
Extension of Time, which the Court granted on June 6, 2011, allowing
Petitioner twenty additional days to respond to the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss. No response from the Petitioner was ever filed. On November
4, 2011, the Court issued an Order Dismissing the Post Conviction Relief
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Petition. The Order Dismissing Post Conviction Relief Petition was
served on Petitioner’s counsel, Respondent’s Counsel, and a copy was
mailed to the Petitioner on November 4, 2011 according to the Certificate
of Service.
On June 29, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and Notice
for Re-hearing on Order of Dismissal stating Petitioner had recently been
made aware that appointed counsel misled him regarding representation
and filings in his post-conviction case. The Idaho Supreme Court entered
a Remittitur based on its Order dismissing Petitioner’s appeal as untimely.
Petitioner also filed a motion for appointment of counsel in this underlying
case, which the Court granted on July 6, 2016. Then, the Court granted
Petitioner an extension of time to file additional documents in the case
until December 1, 2016.
(R., pp.117-19 (footnotes omitted).)
On November 29, 2016, Wall, through appointed counsel, filed an I.R.C.P. 60(b)
motion seeking relief from the district court’s November 4, 2011 order summarily
dismissing his post-conviction petition. (R., pp.74-95.) In the motion and supporting
affidavit, Wall admitted he “received the order dismissing his petition,” but he claimed
that his post-conviction counsel at the time led him to believe counsel was “taking actions
to either appeal or set aside that dismissal,” that counsel “assured him that his case was
being worked on,” and that counsel “periodically visit[ed] him at IDOC facilities into the
summer of 2013” and “took his phone calls into the middle of 2014.” (R., pp.77, 82-83.)
Wall further alleged that, in the beginning of 2016, he contacted a different attorney “to
inquire about the status of his case,” and that attorney informed him “that the case had
been dismissed in November, 2011, and the time had passed to challenge the dismissal.”
(R., pp.77, 82.) Citing post-conviction counsel’s failures to have filed an amended
petition, responded to the state’s answer, or filed “any substantive response to the court’s
Notice of Intent to Dismiss,” Wall argued there was “a complete absence of meaningful
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representation on his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief” and, as such, requested relief
from the summary dismissal order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and Eby v. State, 148
Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010). (R., pp.77-78.)
After allowing the state to file a written response and conducting a hearing (see
R., pp.108-16), the district court entered an order denying Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion
(R., pp.117-22). Specifically, the court ruled the motion was untimely because Wall
failed to bring the motion within a reasonable time of the entry of the summary dismissal
order, as required by I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). (R., p.120.) The court also denied the motion on
the merits, ruling that Wall “failed to show, plead or present any evidence with the
motion for relief from judgment of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
meritorious defense to the action in this case.” (R., pp.120-21.)
Wall filed a notice of appeal, timely from the court’s order denying his I.R.C.P.
60(b) motion. (R., pp.123-25.) Although the district court appointed counsel to represent
Wall on appeal (R., pp.126-27), the Idaho Supreme Court subsequently granted appointed
counsel’s motion to withdraw, filed after Wall requested to proceed pro se (12/8/17
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule;
12/12/17 Order Granting Motion).
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ISSUE
Wall’s opening brief does not contain a “short and concise” statement of the
issues on appeal, as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(4). (See generally “Petitioner[‘]s Brief”
(hereinafter “Appellant’s brief”).) The state phrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Wall failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his untimely, meritless I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the November 4, 2011 order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Wall Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying His
I.R.C.P. 60(b) Motion
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, finding that the motion

was both untimely and failed on its merits. (R., pp.117-22.) On appeal, Wall “prays this
Honorable Court grant [his] pleadings under I.R.C.P. 60(b)“ (Appellant’s brief, p.1
(capitalization altered)), but he has failed to address, much less challenge with argument
and authority, either of the bases upon which the district court denied his motion (see,
generally, Appellant’s brief). The court’s order denying Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion
must therefore be affirmed on these unchallenged bases. Alternatively, this Court should
affirm because application of the law to the facts shows the district court properly
exercised its discretion in denying Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion.

B.

Standards Of Review
A trial court’s decision whether to grant relief pursuant to I.R.C.P.
60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be upheld if it
appears that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its
determination through an exercise of reason.

Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228 P.3d 998, 1001 (2010) (quoting Waller v. State,
Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 237–38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061–62 (2008)
(internal citations omitted)).
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When the basis for a trial court’s ruling is not challenged on appeal, the appellate
court will affirm on the unchallenged basis. State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366-67,
956 P.2d 1311, 1313-14 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

This Court Should Affirm The District Court’s Order Denying Wall’s I.R.C.P.
60(b) Motion On The Unchallenged Bases That The Motion Was Both Untimely
And Failed On Its Merits
The district court denied Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, finding the motion was

both untimely and failed on its merits. (R., pp.117-22.) Wall urges this Court to “grant
[his] pleadings under I.R.C.P. 60(b)“ because, according to Wall: (1) “all attorney’s [sic]
at every critical stage of this matter from pre-trial to appeal fell markedly below that of
competent counsel,” and (2) he has a number of “meritorious defense[s]” to the first
degree murder charge of which he was convicted in the underlying criminal case.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.1-5 (capitalization altered).) Wall, however, has not challenged the
district court’s ruling that he failed to bring his motion within a reasonable time, as
required by I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). (See R., p.120.) Nor has he challenged the court’s ruling
that he failed in his motion to “plead or present any evidence” of facts which, if
established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the summary dismissal order in the
post-conviction case. (See R., pp.120-21.) Because Wall has failed to challenge either of
the bases upon which the district court denied his I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, the district
court’s order denying the motion must be affirmed. Goodwin, 131 Idaho at 366-67, 956
at 1313-14 (trial court’s rulings will be affirmed on unchallenged bases); see also Stewart
v. Sun Valley Co., 140 Idaho 381, 384, 94 P.3d 686, 689 (2004) (“Error is never
presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is on the party alleging it.” (quotations
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omitted)); Farrell v. Board of Com’rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 390, 64 P.3d 304,
316 (2002) (appellant carries burden of showing error on record and error never
presumed); State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (appellant
has burden of showing error in record).

D.

Alternatively, Application Of The Law To The Facts Shows The District Court
Properly Exercised Its Discretion In Denying Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) Motion
Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P., provides a means for an aggrieved party to obtain relief from

a “‘final judgment, order, or proceeding’ directly from the trial court without resorting to
an appeal.” Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Hoopes v. Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1990)). The rule
specifies a number of grounds upon which relief may be granted, including: (1) “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; (2) “newly discovered evidence …”; (3)
“fraud …, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party”; (4) a void judgment;
(5) a satisfied judgment; or (6) “any other reason justifying relief.” I.R.C.P. 60(b); Ross,
141 Idaho at 672, 115 P.3d at 763. There is no express time limitation for filing a motion
for relief from judgment on the grounds set forth in I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4)-(6); however, such
motion must “be made within a reasonable time.” I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). In addition, to be
entitled to Rule 60(b) relief, the party seeking relief must “show, plead or present
evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the
action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663, 670 (Ct.
App. 1994).
Wall moved for relief from the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction
petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). (R., pp.74-83.) Citing post-conviction counsel’s
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failures to have filed an amended petition, responded to the state’s answer, or filed “any
substantive response to the court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss,” Wall argued there was “a
complete absence of meaningful representation on his Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief” that, in turn, constituted a “unique and compelling circumstance” warranting
relief from the summary dismissal order. (R., pp.77-78.) The district court recognized
the decision to grant an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion is discretionary but, considering and
applying the correct legal standards, concluded Wall was not entitled to the relief he
sought because his Rule 60(b)(6) motion was both untimely and failed to present a
meritorious defense to the summary dismissal order. (R., pp.119-21.) Even if this Court
reviews the district court’s rulings despite Wall’s failure to have specifically challenged
them, correct application of the law to the facts of this case shows the district court
properly exercised its discretion in denying Wall’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
As noted above, a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief from a final judgment
or order must bring a Rule 60(b)(6) motion “within a reasonable time” of the entry of the
judgment or order from which the relief is being sought. I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). Although
Idaho’s appellate courts do not appear to have determined what constitutes a “reasonable
time” for bringing a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, in the
context of deciding the timeliness of post-conviction claims, that a “reasonable time” is
measured from the date the petitioner discovered the factual basis of the claim being
asserted. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 251, 220 P.3d 1066, 1070 (2009).
Applying this standard in this case, there can be no question Wall did not bring his Rule
60(b)(6) motion within a “reasonable time.”
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The district court entered its order summarily dismissing Wall’s post-conviction
petition on November 4, 2011, and a copy of the order was mailed to Wall the same day.
(R., pp.58-59, 75, 82, 118, 120.) As found by the district court and conceded by Wall
below, Wall received the copy of the order of dismissal and “inquired of post-conviction
counsel” about it. (R., pp.75, 77, 82, 120.) Yet, despite being aware in November 2011
that his post-conviction petition had been dismissed, Wall did not file his I.R.C.P.
60(b)(6) motion for relief from that order until five years later, on November 29, 2016.
(See R., p.74.) On its face, the five-year delay between Wall’s discovery of the dismissal
order and his filing of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from that order was not
reasonable and, as such, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding
the motion was time-barred.
In an attempt to show he filed his motion within a “reasonable time” of the entry
of the summary dismissal order, Wall claimed that he had intermittent contact with his
post-conviction counsel until “some time around the middle of 2014” and, until then,
believed “there was work being done on [his] case to address the dismissal.” (R., pp.77,
82.) The district court accepted these assertions as true but correctly noted that, even
after Wall’s post-conviction counsel ceased communicating with him in mid-2014, Wall
waited over another two years to file his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. (R., p.120.) Whether
calculated as a five-year delay from the entry of the summary dismissal order or as a twoyear delay from the time post-conviction counsel allegedly stopped communicating with
him about the post-conviction case (at which time Wall should have reasonably known
counsel was no longer working to “address the dismissal”), the district court acted well
within its discretion in concluding that Wall failed to bring his Rule 60(b)(6) motion

9

within a “reasonable time.” The court’s order denying Wall’s motion should therefore be
affirmed on this basis.
The district court also acted well within its discretion in denying Wall’s motion on
its merits. As previously noted, in addition to meeting the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b),
a party seeking relief from a final judgment or order must also “show, plead or present
evidence of facts which, if established, would constitute a meritorious defense to the
action.” Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho at 317, 870 P.2d at 670. Wall, however,
failed to do so. Although Wall argued in his Rule 60(b) motion that relief from the
summary dismissal order was appropriate because of a “complete absence of meaningful
representation on his petition for post-conviction relief,” nowhere in his motion or
affidavit did he plead or present evidence of facts that, if established, would constitute a
meritorious defense to the court’s order dismissing each of his post-conviction claims.
(See R., pp.74-83.)

Because Wall failed to plead or present evidence sufficient to

overcome summary dismissal, the district court acted well within its discretion in denying
Wall’s motion for relief from the summary dismissal order. See Ponderosa Paint Mfg.,
Inc., 125 Idaho at 317-18, 870 P.2d at 670-71 (“It would be pointless to vacate a summary
judgment and reopen the proceeding if the party seeking relief has not shown that it can
raise genuine factual issues sufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion.”).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
denying Wall’s I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from the order summarily dismissing his
petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2018.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming_____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of April, 2018, served two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ROBROY WALL, JR.
IDOC #77817
I.S.C.I. Unit 11
P.O. Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707
/s/ Lori A. Fleming_____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/vr
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